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ADDRESS DELIVERED BY JESSE W. CARTER,
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA,
BEFORE THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY,
RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA, ON SEPTEMBER 29TH. 1954,
ENTITLED "WILL THESE DECISIONS STAND?"

-- On

the fourth floor of the State BuIld.ing in San

Francisco where the Supreme Court of California haa its
headquarters, there is a long hallway where the photographs ot
allot the Justices of the Supreme Court are hung In accordance
with the era in which they served.
to

my

As I walk down this hallway

office which Is near the tar end, I occasionally glance

.

at these pictures and the thought comes into

my

mind that it

will only be a matter of time until my successor will be dOing
the same thing -- when all that will remain as far as I am
concerned, will be the picture on the wall and what I have
written which has been printed in the California Reports
Sometimes I wonder why I should continue with the struggle ot
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attempting to prepare oplnlona which will meet with the approval
of a majority ot

my

associate8 or write dissenting opinions when

I cannot agree with the vi.ws expressed by them.

At times it

seemB that all the great problema which have been decided by my
predecessors were ot small import compared to those which are
presented to our Court today. and I pause and retlect upon the
question ot what solution would have been reached had these same
problems been submitted to those who sat before me on the Court.
As I view the kaleidoscope ot the past. many ot those who have
preceded me pass in review.

I see Hastings. F1eld. Terry.

Wallace. McFarland. Beattie, Angelotti, Shaw, W1lbur and many
others sitting where I now sit.

Allot these men were faced

with the current problems ot the day and the reported decisions
reveal the care with wh1ch they met and disposed ot the questions
confronting themo

During various periods there were strong

difterences ot opinion between members of the Court on
fundamental principles and I sometimes speculate on what changes
might have taken place 1n our political, economic and social
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structure had the views ot the minor1ty. rather than those ot the
majorlty, prevalled.

As we read the reported declsions in the

llght ot present dal conditione. we have a clearer concept or
what would have been the w1seat course to pursue at that t1me and
I

wonder at tlmes wb7 tba t course was not pursued by a major! t7

ot that long ago court.
We know from a reading ot the Cal1fornia Reports that
many dec1slons whlch seemed to r.ve a sound basis when they were

rendered were later overruled or 80 mod1fled or d1st1ngui8hed
that they ceased to have any authoritatIve value, and 80 I have
dec1ded to speak to you tonight relatlve to some ot the recent
decisions ot the supreme Court ot Oalifornia and to otter the
bold predict10n that these decis10ns wlll not stand the test ot
time
The cases which I shall discuss, have, I believe. when
viewed dispassionately, some very rid1culous aspects, not only
so tar &s the law is concerned, but so tar &8 the logical
consequences are concerned.

With all due apologies to my good
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friend. ErIe Stanley Gardner. the cases which I intend to talk
about tonight could have. and should have. the type ot title
used by him 1n his myster, novels
The first ot these caaes. Pickens v. Johnson (42 Cal.
ad 399) should really be called the "CASE OP THE REAPPEARING

JUDGE."

In that case it appeared J. O. Moncur was elected in

1944 as Judge of the Superior Court ot Plumas County for the
full term ot six years which he served until the 1aat day ot his
term when he retired pursuant to the provisions ot the Judge's
Retirement Act (stats. 1937. p. 2204).

Atter hia term expired.

Judge Moncur was assigned to sit 1n the Superior Court ot
Sacramento County by the chairman ot the Judicial Council. and
presided at the trial ot that case.

Section 6 ot the Retirement

Act provides that "Justices and judges retired under the
provisions ot this act. so long as they are entItled by ita
provisions to receive a retirement allowance. shall be Judicial
officers ot the state. but shall not exercise any ot the
powers ot a JustIce or Judge except while under assignment to a

~-

thereot.
void.

court

a8 hereinafter

may, with his

JUdicial

than.

It

that
shall

a8signed

therein

dltterence#

ir

court

in addition
any,

between

one time thi8

section

all

must stipulate

but that

provision

the parties
that

any judgment

A majority

section
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that

rendered

ot

in a court.
to his
hie

he shall

retirement

retirement

that

that

the

and the

was unconstitutional

declined

Act was unconstitutional.

ror

could act.

by another amendment.

relying

At

the counsel

judge

by Judge Moncur whIle
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while

to which he i8 assigned."

section

IV or the Const1tution.

or judge

allowances

the retired

omitted
this

and

be paid

allowance

the Supreme court,

6 of the Retirement

as. or higher

the powera o~ a justice

was amended to provide

was later

contended

22a or Article

or

from which he has retired;

have all
to 8it

jurisdict10n

compensation of a judge of the court

concerned

justice

own consent~ be as8igned by the Chairman or the

so assigned

sitting

Any such retired

Council in a court ot like

jurisdiction
while

provided.

One of
and

so sitting

was

upon section
to hold

that

Section

22&.

so tar as here pertinent.

provides

have power to provide

the payment of retirement

employees ot the state

tor

who shall

that

"The Legi8lature

quali.ty

there.tor

the work ot the State a. provided bY'law.
have power to fix
and conditions

tor a retirement

&s the LegIslature

a retired

himself

may prescribe.
the

Judic1al
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concluded
office;

judge..

available

that
that
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Retirement

shall

as a condItion
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as a judge
of the
judge

the matter.
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a ~nImum

the majority

could

condition.

Council.

in a de jure

and that

provide

!DUet con8Ider

when called

Judicial

that

o~ the

validly

to retIrement.

was valid;

Act was constitutional

Include

"

...

the Legislature

he was a de jure

said concerning

in

and such other

Just quoted.

by the chairman

his

b'H service

age and m1nimum

by such employees

Supreme Court reasoned that
that

to

The Legislature

which shall

a min1mumattained

of funds

Using

salaries

and from time to time change the requirements

per1od ot service.
contribution

shall

section

nothing

for

It was

judicial
6 of the

more need be

Naturally. I dissented.

I pointed out that

Constitution prov1des that Judges ot the superior court shall be
elected by the voters ot that part10ular county (Art. VI, sec. 6);
that 1n the event ot a vacanc7 1n the ott1ce. the Governor may
app01nt a person to hold ottice until the commencement or the
term ot a person elected to hold that ott1ce; that the term ot
ottice 1s six years (Art. VI, sec. 8).

I also pOinted out that

under these provisions 1t has been held that a purported Judicial
act done by a judge atter his term of otfice has expired has no
force or effect (Martello v. Superlor Court, 202 cal. 400;
Connolly v. Ashworth, 98 Cal. 205; Mace v. O'Reilley, 70 Cal. 231;
Broder v. Conklin, 98 Cal. 360; People v. Ruet, 14 CaloAppo 516);
that the Leg1slature cannot extend the term ot a Judge fixed by
the Constitutlon (People v. Campbell, 138 Cal. ll} People v.
Markham, 104 Cal. 232); nor conter upon hlm Judlclal power atter
his term has expired, where the Constltutlon fixes his term of
office and mode ot aelectlon (Hallam v. Tillinghast, 19 Wash. 20,

52 P. 329).
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There are vital difterences between the duties ot
lawyers and Judges.

When a lawyer 1. elected or appointed to a

Judioial posU;lon. he i. automatical11 retired tJ!llOll membership

in the state Bar ot Californla and his payment ot dues thereto
18 suspended during the tlme he remains on the Bench.

A lawyer

Is an advocate, a partisan, a confident tal adv1sor ot h1s
cllents.

A Judge is non-part1san -- he is required to welgh

and consider the evldence, the law, and render tair and impartial
decisions.

Different codes ot ethlcs apply; certaln

constitutional provlsions apply to judges or Justlces.

When a

Judge retires or is deteated when runnIng tor reelectIon, he i.
agaln a lawyer subject to the state Bar Act; he m&7 again have
cllents; he 1s agaln an advocate and a partIsan It he so
deslres.
Under the majorIty holdIng in the Plckens case, we
have a lawyer subject to the state Bar Act who. despIte all
constltutional mandates to the contr&r1. may assume judlclal
dutles, may thwart the wl11 ot the People by actlng as a Judge
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although not validly reeleoted by them. may have dutiea as a
lawyer to perform tor certa1n clienta, and Judicial dutIes to
pertorm tor law;ere . who mal in his private lalqer'. 11te, be hie
oppoait1on.
baa

Such a JUdge has not been elected by the voters; he

not been appoInted

by

the Governor; he has been aaslgned;· bl

the chairman ot the Judicial Counc1l because a major1tJ ot the
Supreme Court bas held that the Legislature may interfere with
the tunctionlng ot the judlQlal department ot th1s state 1n clear
v1olation ot the express constItutional mandate provlding tor a
separation ot powera -- into the executive, Judic1al and
legislative branches ot the government.
Money received

a8

retirement compensation 1s because ot

past services rendered and It was not contemplated that It should
also be received because services might be required in the tuture.
When a man retIres, the usual meaning plaoed on that ret1rement
18 that he wanta to have leisure t1mein wh1ch to enJ ol that

whlch he has earned In the past.

A majoritl ot the court, however,

have now held by a strained, unreasonable, and wholly unwarranted,
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construction ot sectlon 22& ot Article IV ot the Constitution ot
this state that the Legislature m&7 provide that his compensation
is partially baaed on his implied agreement to be subject to
call, or aSSignment, b7 the chairman ot the JUd1eial Council.
Wh1le the present act provides tor his consent to such aSSignment,
it is obvious that the Legislature may elim1nate this requirement.
The 10g1cal consequence ot the holding is that a
ret1red judge may not know trom one day to the next whether he Is
a lawyer or a judicial officer ot the state.

What happens when a

retired Judge. once more a law,er. subject to the state Bar Act
and payment ot dues thereunder. is ass1gned to a Judicial
position?

Are his state Bar duesretunded to hlm?

what happens

to his clients it he i8 actively engaged In the pract1ce of law?
with whom Is hi. loyalty -- his clients or lawyers who appear
before him?

Is he subject to both jud1cial and attorney's Codes

ot Ethlcs and whlch prevails 1n the event at a conflict?
The etfect at the majority holding In the P1ckens case
ls that retlred judges or justices even though the1r respective
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terms ot otflce have explred are atl1l Judlc1&l oftlcers ot the
state.

This is clearly contrary to the holding ot the Supreme

Court ot Ca1ltorn1a In the 80-cal1ed
Cal1fornia v. Superlor Court. 203
w1l1 recall JUdge Carlos

Hardy

Hardy

cal.

case (state Bar ot

323).

In that caae you

accepted a love otterlng ot

$2.500 trom Aimee Semple MacPherson while he was superior Judge
ot Los Angeles County.

Mrs. MacPherson said It was tor legal

advice given her, and the state Bar sought to discipline Judge
Hardy who claimed that he was not subject to the j1ll'isdiction ot

the state Bar because he was not engaged in the practice ot law.
and the Supreme Court ot Calitorn1a upheld his position.

So

then we have the unique s1tuation ot a judge whose term haa
expired and who 1s entitled to retirement pay and also entitled
to practlce law beIng a judlcial off1cer ot the state and subject

to asslgnment by the chalrman ot the Judicial Council to sit in
any superior court or court ot hlgher Jurisdictlon In the state.
What serious consequences may tlow trom conflicts which may
arise out ot situations ot this character are Impossible to
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foresee. but they may be· devious and tar-reaching and have a serious
detrimental eftect upon the administration ot justice in this
state.

NotWithstanding the holding 1n the Pickens case that a

retired judge or justice whose term of office has expired is a
judicial officer of the state. the Supreme Court of

Calito~nia

recently held that when a superior judge is injured In the course

ot his duty the county which elected him is liable tor the
benefits to which he is entitled under the Workmen's Compensation
Act.

Can we not visualize a retired judge from one of the

mountain counties being assigned to sit in Los Angeles and while
there under assignment being killed or seriously injured and
either he or his dependents entItled to benefits under the
Workmen's Compensation Act.
guess Is as good as mlne.

Where wl11 the burden tall' Your
Thus ends the "CASE OF THE REAPPEARING

JUDGE"!

Next we have the "CASE OF THE m!,PRIVILEGED CITIZEN. n
In Prlce agalnst the Atchison, Topeka and santa Fe (42 Cal.2d

517) we were concerned with a plalntift injured on two different
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oo0&8ion& while emplo7ed bJ the detendant railroad cOmpanJ in
interstate commerce.

Both acc1dents occurred 1n New Mex1co.

Detendant pleaded a8 a special detense the doctrlne ot forum non
conveniena and moved under that doctr1ne to dIsmlss the actlon.
The tr1al oourt granted defendant's motion and entered Judgment
ot dlsmissal ot pla1ntift's causes of actlon.
appealed.

The plalnt1ft

A majority ot the Supreme Court ot cal1forn1a

aft1rmed the judgment ot dismissal on two d1fferent grounds.

It

d1scussed the inconvenience and expense to the detendant ot
presentlng ita detense to plaIntIff's actlon in the Los Angeles
court; and it discussed the great burden upon the courts and
people ot this state in hearing and determInIng cases ot this
character.

We had held in Leet v. Union Paciflc (25 Ca1.2d 605)

that the doctrine ot torum non conveniens was no Justitication
for a state court to refuse JurisdictIon ot an actIon under the
Federal Employers' Liabil1ty Act; that it was conclusive that
the state court must take Jurisdiction having no choice in the
matter.

Our decision was based upon the holding ot the Supreme
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Court ot the United states in Miles v. Illinois Central R. R.
~o •• (315 U.S.

698). The maJorlty. however. relled upon the

later case ot Southern R. Co. v. Mayfield (340

u.s.

1) declded

by the Supreme Court ot the Unlted state. 1n 1950. which held
that the Miles case did not limit the power ot the state to den,
access to ita courts to persona seeking recovery under the

.....

Federal Employers' Liability Act it in similar cases the state

tor reasons ot local policy denies resort to its courts and
enforces 1ts policy 1mparttally so as not to involve a
discrimination against Employers' Liability Act sults and not to
ottend against the Privileges and Immunities Clause ot the
Constitution.

OUr Court held that the argument that the doctrine

should not apply because ot the tact that an action tiled by a
nonresident oit1zen might be barred by the statutes ot lim1tation
was without mer1t.

The majority said:

"It plaintiff chooses

without justification to bring his action under circumstances
warranting application ot the doctrine it is a deliberate risk
assumed by him and he must be prepared to meet any 1088es
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8ustained

a8

a result"; that he could have obv1ated this

ditf1culty by til1ng in a federal d1strict court where the action
would be subject to transfer rather than dismissalo
Again, I dIssented.

I p01nted out that a statute, or

court-made l"Ule ot law which would perm! t a trial court to dismiss
an action brought by a c1tIzen ot another state upon a cause ot
action ar1sing out ot this state would be invalid as violative
ot the prIvileges and 1mmunities clause ot the federal

Const1tution unless it was applied equally against citizens ot
this state.

I also poInted out that Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line

R. Co., (345 u.s. 379) decided by the UnIted states Supreme Court
1n 1953

ca~considerable

doubt upon the holding in the Maytield

case relied upon by the majorIty.
statute (28 U.S.C.A •• § l404(a»

The pope case held that the
author1zIng a federal district·

court to transter a federal employers' l1ability act10n to another
federal court on the ground ot convenIence dId
to enjoIn on a state court.

B2! confer

power

It by reasonot the 11ability act

which gives a rIght to the Injured person to sue 1n the state
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cOUPta. one state court carmot enJoln another. a state torum
should' not be empowered to dlsmi•• tor inconvenlenoe.
I teel that another reason ex1ated. tor retuains to
app17 the inconvenience doctrine and that was that we had

repeatedly held that a court baa
and

&

mandatop;v duty to consider

determine on the merita all cases over whlch it has

Jurlsdlotlon (Gering v. SuperIor Court. 37 cal.2d. 29. Robln.on
v. SuperIor Court, 35 Cal.2d 319; Turealcy v. SuperIor Court,
91 Cal.App.2d 838; CIty ot San Dlego v. Andrews, 195 Cal. 111)

and that the court does and should exerclse JurIsdlctlon In
transltory causes ot actIon arlaing elaewhere (McKee v. Dodd.
152 Cal. 637. 'Ryan v. Horth Alaska Salmon co •• 153 Cal. 438).
We have specifically stated (Miller v. Municipal Court, 22 Cal.
2d 818). rolloving a decislon by the Supreme Court ot the United
states, that inconvenience attords no reason ror declining
jurisdiction conferred

by

law.

The existence ot the jurisdiction

create8 an implication ot duty to exercise It, and that its
exercise may be onerous does not milItate against that
implIcatIon.
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The maJoritJ hold1ng does tor the railroad compan1es
what they have not been able to get Congress or the Legislature
to do tor them.

Chiet JU8tIce Warren when Governor ot this

state, vetoed two b1lls which sought to introduce In th1a state
the doctrine ot forum non conveniens.
message:

He sa14 In hls veto

"It we are to Whlttle away in th1s manner the benefits

conterred by the Federal Employers' L1abillty Act. it would soon
lose its natlonal unitormlty and could at lea8t substantially
weaken the purposes tor whlch the act was or1ginally des1gnated.
At all events it any ot the provisions ot the act result
in a denial ot Justlce to e1ther plalntitts or detendants. the
situation could be remedied nationwide by & simple act of
The holding ot our court 18 not limited to Federal

Congress."

Employers' Llability Act cases but to transitory out-ot-state
causes ot actlon. even when brought by a cltizen ot this state.
so far as the consequences ot the majorIty holdIng are
concerned. it puts upon the plaintift the risk ot ehoosing the
right torum.

According to the majority. this is immaterial.
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I say it is harsh indeed.

A plaint1tr i8 forced to speculate not

onlJ on how the trial court mar de01de the que.tion but also what
the view. or an appellate court mar be.

Suppose a case where the

looation ot the witne••es 18 equallJ divi4e4 between the state ot
the chosen rorum aDd another or other tactors are equally
balanced.

The plaintift has no means ot predIctIng the court'.

decisIon.

He is left at the mercy ot the defendant and in redlty

must have hIs prIor approval

ot a partIcular court.

Plaintirt

haVing the right to have a partIcular court exercise ita
jurisdiction. and that court having jurisdiction. should be able
to have the diam1ssal denied in any case where the statute ot
lImitations will have run by the time that issue

~~s

tinally

determined.
The questIon presented was one ot great magnitude.

It

involved conSiderations of public policy of great importance not
only to those who might wish to prosecute out-of-state causes of
action in our courts. but to our courts as well. considering the
impact upon our court procedure ot numerous motions to dismiss
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such actions in tr1al courts. aDd a review bl our appellate
court. ot rulinsa on such motions, i8 bound to create perplexing
It seemed to me that 1t the doc trine ot torum non

problema.

conven1ena was to be adopted 1n this state. it should have been
by legi8lation Where ample eateguards oould bave been provided

to protect those p1aint1tts Who 1n good falth and atter proper
adv1ce. sought redress 1n our courts tor out-of-state causes ot
actlon.

Bad such a statute been enacted .. It would undoubtedl:f

have embraced rules
applicat10n

or

or

procedure to gulde the courts 1n the

the doctrine.

1 should polnt out to you that this 1s the t1rst holdIng

ot Itsk1nd In th1s state although man:.r Federal Employers'
Liabi11ty cases have been decided here as well as other out-otstate causes ot actlon.

Heretofore 1t had been held that the

courts must exerc1ae their undoubted Jurisdlct10n 1n all casea
ind1scrim1nately.
The next two eases might very well be called the
"CASES OF THE DISAPPOIN'l'ED WIVES."
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In

Zaragosa v. Craven

(33 Oal.ad 315) a wite was held barred from recovering tor her
personal

1n~le.

becaus. ot her huaband'. oontrlbutor,

negligence 1n the accident where ahe was injured by the
detendant· 8 negligence.

The conclusion __ 8&14 to tol10w.

logically. troa the oomm:unity propert}r la_ ot thi. state which
glve to the huband the management and oontrol ot the communlty.
To permit the wite to recover tor her personal inJuriea wa. sald
to be a perm1ss10n to the husband to protlt from h1s own wrong.
I palnted out ln a dlesentlng opinion tbat the communIt}r property
laws In Calitornia provide tbat all property acqulred by the
apouses during marrlage other than that acqulred

by

or descent, was property belonging to the commun1ty.

gitt. devlse
I sald that

the wite brought her body to the marriage and that it was her
personal property and that she was certainly entltled to retain
control over it and to recover damages tor its loss. or injury
a8

the result ot another's negligence where she was not at tault.

I quoted extensively trom William de
CommunI ty Property.

Funia~'a

Principles ot

Mr. de Funiak. an acknowledgEd author1ty on
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the pr1Dolplea ot communlt, propertJ. said that except
clearl1 made to the marital communltJ. c01DD1UnltJ propert,J on17
cons18ts 0:1 that wbloh 18 aoqulred b;J onerous title. that 18. b7

labor or Indust17 ot the spauaea. or which Is acquired 1n
exchange tor communi tJ property. which. ot course. was acquired
itselt by onerous t1tle.

I pointed out that alnce the right ot

actlon tor injury to the person is intended to repalr or make
whole the

inJ~.

80 tar as is possible In such a case. the

compensation partakes ot the same character a8 that which has
been Injured or suttered 108s.
Suppose the case ot • wite who loses a leg. or an arm.
in an automobile accident 1n which her husband. as driver ot
the veh1c1e. was contributorl17 negligent.

She is without &OJ

right to recover because ot her husband's conduct even though
the other partJ Involved may have been grossly negligent.

Now

suppose a case where either a husband. or wite. loses a leg or
an arm and there i8 no contr1butory negligence involved.

Under

the present community property theory the recovery belongs to
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the community.

So tar as the husband is concerned" the theory

does not have the P088Ibl11t" of workIng hardship and Inequit"
as 1t does where the wite 18 concerned. because it is he who has
the management and control ot the community which includes
compensation tor Injur,J to the person ot either spouse.

any

The

bodies ot the spouses having been brought to the marriage a8 the
separate property ot each. and ot neceaait" remalnlng such.
should necessarily be the separate property ot the spouse injured.
Atter the Zaragosa case had been declded by the
Supreme Court ot California. the Supreme Court ot New Mexico had
betore it a sim1lar caae.

It~

however" held that the cause ot

action tor the personal injury to the wlte. and tor the
resultant pain and suttering, belonged to the wite and that the
Judgment and ita proceeds were her separate propert".

It was

sald "She brought her body to the marrtage and on ita
dlssolutlon 1a entitled to take it away; she 18 simllarly
entitled to compensation trom one who has wrongfully vlolated
her right to personal security.-
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In speaking ot the zaragoaa

had ~ver said a. l<:lnd word fDr' the

rua.Jorlty deelslon., it had

I

escaped thetr notice!

or
were
and

It was also pointed out that under t;he

the

1n
to

a

some driver or a motor

v~hicle

negligently struck her and

the horse. throwing both into a renee. breaking the leg of each,
the cause ot action for the damage to the horse would belong to
the wIfe. but that tor the injury to her would belong to the
community over wh1ch the husband had the management and controlo
It was concluded that "We

d(~ellne to

adopt such a rule in New

Mex1co~n

Nevada also holds that compensation tor a personal

In.1ury belongs to the person lnjured o

(Fredrickson &:: Watson

In 1951 the CalIfornia Leg1slature enacted section 111c
of the Civil Code tor the obviOUS purpose of changing the rule
announced 1n the

~arago8a caseg

and while it is not altogether

-23-

aa clear a8 mi8ht be 4ea1re4. 1t waa a step in the rl8ht
d1rect10n.

This new sectlon has never been betore the Supreme

Court ot California for construct10n

80

1t i8 too 800n to

predict whether the legislative Intent10n has been made clear.
Kesler v. Pabst

(~3

A.C. 256) .as another case where

the witets cause of action was barred because of the contrlbutory
negligence ot the husband.

The JU17 was Instructed that her

husband's contr1butory negl1gence would be
bar her recovery.

~ted

to her and

Subsequent to the acoident, the husband. had.

by written instrument, rellnquished anJ interest in her cause ot
action Which he might bave to her.

It was held by the majority

that thls purported relinquishment would not prevent the
negligent husband trom protltlng by h1s own wrong.

This

conclusion was reached upon the theory that by h1s act ot
rel1nquishment, the husband had sought to exercise control over
his interest in the community cause ot action; that the right to
dispose of property was a major Interest ot the owner and that
to permit him to do so in such a 8ituation would create an
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enforceable r1ght 1n his donee which had not theretofore
eX1sted.
I aga1n dissented.

I pointed out that 1n an ear11er

case decided bl the Supreme Court, 1'10res v. Brown, (39 0&1.24
622,) the Court bad perm1tted the wUe to reoover .. despite her

husband' 8 contr1butory negligence, where the husband had been
killed 1n the accident which injured the wUe.

I called to the

Court's attention the undeniable fact that the cause of act10n

tor personal injuries ar1ses at the t1me ot the a n o1dent; and
that the marr1age 1n the Piores case had not been d1ss01ved by
death pr10r to the time the cause ot act10n ar08e.

I t the cause

ot act10n in the Flores eaee was communit7 propertJ.. then &117
recovery theretor was a180 co1lll1u1l1ty •

In the Florea case.

however, the Court allowed the wldow to recover, say1ng that to
allow her to recover tor her personal 1nJuries wl11 in no way
enrich Mr. Plores or those who might take through him.

under

this reasorUng Mrs. Floree would not ha:ve recovered had her
husband 11ved. but through hls death he enabled hls w1dow to
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receIve a beneflt she would not otherwlse have had because of hls
contrlbutor,J negligence.

his death, he created in her an

By

entorceab1e rlght that 4id not theretofore exist and in fact
profited b,- hls own wrong.

In the Flore. case, the re1lnquishment

waa achieved by death atter the cauae of action arose; in the

Kesler case, it

wa. relinquished bl wrltten Instrument atter the

cause ot actlon arose.
The obvious questlon ariseal

What wl11 happen when a

husband and wlte, prior to any aCCident, relinqulsh to each
other thelr respectlve rights

and

lnterests in any cause ot

actlon whlch might possibly arlse 1n the future?

What wl11 the

Supreme Court ot california do then" ladies and gentlemen?
Will we atll1 have the "CASE OF THE DISAPPOINTED WIVES"?
At one time 1n this state, lawyers could, with
reasonable certalnt,-, advise their c1lents who were havlng
domestiC dlfflcult,-, how to provlde for a dlvlslon ot thelr
communlty property and for support and malntenance ot the
spouse" and expect that atter the court had approved the
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agreement of the partles the terms and provIsIons thereot would
be settled for all tlme
Recently. the Supreme Court had betore it at the same
time

the casea ot Dexter v. Dexter (_2 ca1.2d 36); 1'ox v. 1'6x

(_2 C&l.2d 49), and Flynn v. 1'lynn <_2 C&1.2d 55).

In deciding

those case8. lt would have been posaib1e tor the Court to
olar1tJ. once and tor all, the contueion exlstlng 1n the property
settlement

and

support and maintenance t'ie1d.

A maJorlt)' ot'

the Supreme court d14 not see tIt, however. to take advantage

ot 'the opportunlt)'

80

presented

and

the three Jecisions rendered

by it have added untold contusion.
Ver,y brietly. and wlthout doing justlce to the subject.
those three cases hold tha.t the. court ....pproved agreements made
by the parties tor the division ot their community property and
tor support and. maIntenance, even though incorporated into the
decrees ot divorce. may. years later, be again looked at by the
same. or another. trtal court tor it to determine. wIth the
assIstance ot extrInsic ev1dence 1.t need be. whether or not the

-'Z7-

parties real17 meant to prov1de tor a11rloDl'. rather thaD support.
or whether mDnth17 payment. In 11eu ot a lump aum

~nt

.ettlement at o01llDUn1t)t propertJ' rlsbtB really .ere intended to
be allllOD7 and theretore subJeot to the oontinued power ot the
oourt to

modttJ thea upon app11catlon theretor.

Th1a. naturally.

lead. to turther aorutlD7 by the appall. te oourts whloh may. 1t
they tee1 so adv1sed. reverse or attlrlD the conoluslon reached
1n the tr1al court.

Allot wh1ch loglcally results In endlees

I1tlsatlon ot a matter .h10h should have been aettled. tlnally
and conclusively. When the agreement was tlrst approved and
Incorporated In the dlvorce decrees.
The Legislature haa. In several sectlons ot the 01vll
Code (158. 159. 175) provlded that spouses may contract wlth
each other.

In the absence ot traud or overreachlng there Is

no reason why such contracts may not be glven the dlgnlty
accorded other contracts.

I belleve that once the partles have

entered into an agreement. whether It purports to dlvlde the
property. or to provlde tor support and malntenance payments
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wIthout a dIvIsIon ot the

p~~tr.

When tound b7 the oourt to be

fair and equItable. the sUbJeot .hou1d be torever olosed and the
partIes bound b7 the terms of the1r agreement.

IncorporatIon 1n

the decree only hall the .treot ot ..king the remeq on the
Judgment and not on the _areement which baa become merged therein.
In the event the agreement 1s not Inoorporated 1n the decree, the
remed7 is on the agreement whIch should have the _me b1nding

ettect as other contracts.
It i8 my hope that either the present Supreme Court.
or a later Court. will teel it necessary to straIghten out the
law on this subject to the end that lawyers may once aga1n know

how to advise

the~

clIents who wish to have their property

rIghts on separation or divorce conclus1ve17 settled 1n
accordance with the1r own desires on the subject.

It m&7 be

that the Legislature could add more deta1led provisions on the
matter ot marital contracts

80

that the courts would not teel

so tree to ignore the plain intent expressed 1n the sect10ns
now present in the Code.
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I am sure most

or

you Judges and members ot the Bar

here tonlght who have been tollowlng the reported declslona ot
the Supreme Court are aware ot the trend In recent years ot the
Supreme court

to

U8Urp

the functions ot trlen ot tact

redeclde both the iasues ot tact and ·issues ot law.

and

In

~

ot

these cases the issues ot tact have been determined by a jur.y.
passed upon by the trial court on a motlon tor a new trial.
afflrmed by the District Court ot Appeal and reversed by the
Supreme Court wlth trom one to three justices dlssenting.

I

have vigorously opposed this trend because I believe that under
our system ot Jurisprudence tact flndlng powers are reposed
exclusively in the trial court. where the Judge and Jur, have an
opportunIty to hear the witnesses testifY. observe their
demeanor on the stand and gain ImpressIons that can only be
gaIned tram personal observation and through the auditory sense.
These impressions cannot be recorded In a typewrItten or printed
record.

Moreover. the ConstItutIon and statutes ot this state

conter upon an appellate court power to review questIons ot law
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alone and whenever an appellate court welghs the evldence and passes
upon

the credlbility ot wItnesses It Is usurping the function

ot the trial court.

In a recent case decided b7 tbe Supreme Court ot
Calltorn1& on JUly 2nd. 1954. I made the toll owing statement in
my dissentlng opinlons

"I thlnk It is time that this court should speak more
frankly In cases ot thIs character and honestly state the baSis
tor its retusal to recognize the well settled and traditional
rule with respect to the question ot when there is an issue ot
tact to be determined.

In the case at bar It is obvIous that

the majority ot thls court has welghed the evIdence and come to
the conclusIon that It is insufticient to support a tIndlng ot
undue influence.

In

so do1og the uajorl ty has vIolated. the

ConstItutIon ot thIs state in deprivlng the lItIgants in thIs
case ot their right to a trial by jUl7'.

The _jori ty has done

thIs by substItuting Ita vlew as to the weIght ot the evldence
tor that ot the jury. the trIal judge. the three members ot the
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District Court ot Appeal and two members ot th1s court.
no quest10n 1n

mr

There 18

mind but that the maJor1ty dec1s10n 1n th1s

case 1s based 'sole11 upon the v1ew that It and not the Jur,r or
the trial Judge should determine tactual Issues 1n cases ot this
character.

Th18 v1ew 18 in d1rect contl1ot with the Const1tut10n

and statutes ot this state. and in my op1nlon a Judge ot th18
oourt who concurs in such a dec1s10n 1s violat1ng hi8 oath ot
ott1ce."

(E8tate ot

Welch~

While it 18

mw

43 A.C. 113.)

pr1vilege. it 18 not

write d1ssent1ng opinions.

my

pleasure. to

I would muoh preter to concur with

the maJor1ty or have them concur in op1n10ns prepared by me.

The preparat10n ot a dissent requires extra effort -- it 18 an
addit10nal burden
possible.

and

one that I choose to avoid whenever

mr

But I believe It to be

solemn duty when the

maJor1t,r departs trom 8ettled rule8 ot law In renderlng its
decis10n, to call attention to the error in a dissent1ng opinion
1n the hope that the error may be oorrected by a 8ubsequent
decision or by the Legislature.

A di8sentlng opinion may a180
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be helpful in cases which are
Court

o~

subject to review by the Supreme

the United States which. in the last tew years, has

held in accord with aome ot my dissenta and reversed the
Supreme Court ot calitom1a.
I do not claim that I have al..,. been right in my
view ot the law as expressed in mJ dissenting opinions.

I may

have been wrong many times. but I teel it my duty to the people
o~

California to give them the

bene~it o~

my opinion on all

major i.sues which come before the Supreme Court.
attempted to do.

Thi. I have

I claim no credIt -- seek no acclaim or

recognItion for what I have done or may do in the future.

It i •

., job as I see It. "and as long as I have the physical and mental
capacity. I shall continue to perform that duty.

-33-

